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Empirical studies have uncovered an inverted-U relationship between
product-market competition and innovation. This is inconsistent with
the original Schumpeterian Model, where greater competition always
reduces the protability of innovation and thus the incentives to inno-
vate. We show that the model can predict the inverted-U, if the in-
novators' talent is heterogenous, and asymmetrically observable. When
competition is low and protability is high, talented innovators are credit
constrained, since untalented innovators are eager to mimic them. As
competition increases and protability decreases, untalented innovators
become less eager to mimic, and talented innovators can invest more.
This generates the increasing part of the relationship. When competi-
tion is high and protability is low, credit constraints disappear, and
the relationship is decreasing. Our theory generates additional specic
1
predictions that are well born out by the existing evidence.
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Several empirical studies have uncovered an inverted-U relationship be-
tween product-market competition and innovation.1 This nding is incon-
sistent with the original Schumpeterian model (Aghion and Howitt (1992)),
where stronger competition always reduces the incentives to innovate because
it reduces post-innovation rents (the so-called Schumpeterian eect). To ad-
dress this inconsistency, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005)
have modied the original model to allow for innovation by established rms,
who also care about pre-innovation rents. These rms are crucial to explaining
the increasing part of the inverted-U, because it is only for them that compe-
tition may strengthen the incentives to innovate (by decreasing pre-innovation
rents more than it decreases post-innovation rents).
While the mechanism in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt
(2005) is intuitive and easy to believe, we suspect that it may not fully ac-
count for the existence of an inverted-U. On the one hand, a vast majority of
innovations are actually realised by either new entrants, or by established rms
innovating on entirely new product lines - for both of which competition in the
target market should primarily aect post-innovation rents, as in the original
Schumpeterian model.2 This casts a doubt on whether the increasing part of
the inverted-U can entirely be explained by the actions of rms focused on
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pre-innovation rents. On the other hand, some evidence of a positive relation-
ship between competition and innovation has also been found for start-ups,3
which again are less likely to t the notion of rms focused on pre-innovation
rents.
In this paper, we show that the Schumpeterian model can predict the
inverted U even under the original assumption that innovators focus on post-
innovation rents. Only two, reasonable ingredients must be added to that
eect: heterogeneous talent of innovators, and asymmetric information on tal-
ent. We start from a standard version of the model with overlapping genera-
tions and a fringe of competitive producers (as in Aghion and Howitt (2009)),
and allow for innovators to be of two types (talented and untalented), and
for this to be the innovators' private information. We construct a separating
equilibrium in which the talented innovators signal themselves to investors by
contributing their entire wage in equity, and by limiting the amount they bor-
row.4 We study the comparative statics of this equilibrium, and show that
the relationship between the strength of competition and the probability of
innovation is rst increasing and then decreasing.
More in detail, our mechanism works as follow. At low levels of competi-
tion, when post-innovation rents are high, the talented innovators would like
to invest a lot. However, they cannot borrow enough at favourable conditions,
since the untalented innovators are eager to mimic them (given the high prof-
itability of innovation). They then invest less than optimal. As competition
increases and post-innovation rents decrease, the untalented innovators become
less eager to mimic. As this happens, the amount that the talented innovators
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can borrow at favourable conditions increases, leading them to invest more.
This explains the increasing part of the curve. We call this eect the selection
eect, because it leads to a higher weight of the talented innovators in overall
investment. At high levels of competition, when post-innovation rents are low,
the talented innovators would like to invest only a modest amount. Moreover,
they can borrow a lot at favourable conditions, since the untalented agents
are not eager to mimic them. They then invest their optimal amount, which
by the Schumpeterian eect is decreasing in the strength of competition. This
generates the decreasing part of the curve.
One attractive feature of our model is that it rests on reasonable assump-
tions. We have already argued that innovators focused on post-innovation
rents are an empirically relevant group. In addition, talent heterogeneity
and asymmetric information are recognised features of the market for inno-
vation nancing. Hubbard (1998) and Brown and Petersen (2009) argue that
asymmetric information is likely to be a particularly severe problem for R&D-
intensive rms. This is not just because of the inherent diculty to evaluate
frontier research, but also because innovative rms are reluctant to reveal their
ideas to investors, reducing the quality of the signal they can make about po-
tential projects (Lerner and Hall (2010), p. 614). Lerner and Hall (2010) and
Kerr and Nanda (2015) both list asymmetric information on the quality of
projects as one of several key sources of frictions in the market for innovation
nancing. Not only are talent heterogeneity and asymmetric information rea-
sonable assumptions: it is also the case that the credit constraints that these
frictions generate are important enough to explain macro patterns such as the
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inverted-U. For example, Brown and Petersen (2009) argue that most of the
unprecedented 1990s R&D boom can be explained with a relaxation of the
credit constraints of young R&D intensive rms.
To provide corroborating evidence in support of our mechanism, we show
that the equilibrium we characterise has specic features which match the
evidence well. First, the increasing relationship between competition and in-
novation should be more pronounced in industries where credit constraints are
more prevalent. This prediction ts the nding in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Grith, and Howitt (2004), who show that the inverted-U shifts to the right
if one focuses on rms which are more under debt-pressure. Second, credit
constraints should be more severe in industries where prots are higher (either
because competition is lower, or for other reasons). Indeed, several papers in
the nance literature have documented a positive relationship between credit
constraints and return on equity. Interestingly, Li (2011) shows that this re-
lationship is particularly important among R&D intensive rms, where our
mechanism is also likely to be particularly important.
This paper contributes to Schumpeterian growth theory (see Aghion, Ak-
cigit, and Howitt (2014), for a survey). It complements the main existing
explanation for the inverted-U relationship between competition and inno-
vation (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005)),5 by showing
that Schumpeterian theory is consistent with the inverted-U under a broader
(and as discussed above, more empirically relevant) set of assumptions. Other
theoretical explanations of the inverted-U focus squarely on issues of indus-
try organization and dynamics, leaving virtually no role for nancial factors.6
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Conversely, our model puts asymmetric information in nancial markets at
its front and center. This simple, realistic addition to an otherwise standard
model allows us to generate the inverted-U pattern through an intuitive
mechanism.
A number of other papers in the Schumpeterian tradition have placed -
nancial features at center stage. These articles dier from ours in their as-
sumptions (usually and most importantly, the nature of the nancial frictions
they consider), as well as their subject matters and applications. For example,
Diallo and Koch (2018) investigate the relationship between economic growth
and bank concentration. Malamud and Zucchi (2016) study corporate cash
management when rms face exogenous nancing costs. Sunaga (2018) ex-
tends the standard model to deal with moral hazard in nancial markets and
monitoring by intermediaries.7 Bryce Campodonico, Bonfatti, and Pisano
(2016) and Plehn-Dujowich (2009) develop Schumpterian growth models with
adverse selection in nancing, but use them to study optimal tax policy and
to quantify the reduction in the rate of growth stemming from the presence of
nancial frictions, respectively. Finally, Ates and Sae (2013) study a general
equilibrium endogenous growth model in which nancial intermediaries screen
the quality of projects from a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. None
of these papers concerns itself with the relationship between an industry's de-
gree of competition and its R&D outcomes, which is the main focus of the
present essay.
Finally, the paper also relates to the burgeoning literature on the macroe-
conomic implications of nancial frictions (see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and
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Sannikov (2013)), and more specically the branch analyzing their eects on
countries' economic development (see Levine (2005)).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section I we present the baseline
model. Section II introduces imperfect information in nancial markets, and
derives the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Sec-
tion III discusses the empirical validity of two predictions that are specic to
our model. Finally, Section IV concludes.
I BASELINE MODEL
The baseline model is a standard Schumpeterian model with overlapping
generations and a fringe of competitive producers (as in Aghion and Howitt
(2009), pp. 130-32 and 90-91), which we generalise to allow for heterogeneous
talent of innovators. A nal good is produced competitively using labour and








where Xit is input of the latest version of intermediate i, and Ait is its pro-
ductivity. Each intermediate is produced and sold by a monopolist, who can
produce one unit of the intermediate at the cost of one unit of the nal good.
However, in each industry, there is also a fringe of competitive rms that can
produce the intermediate at cost of 1/κi units of the nal good per unit pro-
duced. The parameter κi ∈ [α, 1] measures the strength of competition faced
by the monopolist. As will be clear below, κi = α denotes the case of no com-
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petition, while κi = 1 denotes the case of perfect competition. For simplicity,





Agents live for two periods, are risk neutral, and have a discount factor
equal to one. There are two equally-sized cohorts alive in each period, the
young and the old. The young work in the nal good sector, where they
earn a wage. Before turning old, one of them per industry (the innovator
) tries to invent a new version of the intermediate good which is γ > 1
times more productive than the previous version. If successful, she invests in
the production of the new version, which she sells as the monopolist when
she turns old in the next period. If unsuccessful, a young agent is chosen
at random to invest in the production of the previous version, and to sell it
as the monopolist when he turns old. As for the old agents, there is one of
them in each industry who is the current monopolist, while all others are idle
consumers.
There are borrowers and lenders in this model. Borrowers include young
agents undertaking an investment - be it innovation or production - which they
cannot fund through the wage they have earned. The lenders are all young
agents, who may want to use part of the wage they have earned to consume
when they are old. While production is a risk-free activity, innovators only
pay back if successful. Then, the nancing of innovation is the only interesting
part of the nancial market. We assume that the maximum supply of credit
(the total wage bill) is greater than demand, so that the risk-free interest rate
is equal to the discount rate (zero).
A monopolist faces iso-elastic demand Pit = α (At−1L/Xit)
1−α, given which
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her optimal price is 1/α.9 However, facing competition from the fringe, the
monopolist is forced to charge 1/κi ≤ 1/α instead. Plugging back in the
demand function, we nd the optimal Xit, which can then be multiplied by








in an industry that has not innovated, and γπ (κi) in an industry that has. It
is easy to show that π is decreasing in κi ∈ [α, 1]: intuitively, the stronger is
competition, the lower are the monopolist's prots.
Substituting optimal Xit in the production function, dierentiating with
respect to L, and dividing by At−1, we nd the normalised wage,






κidi is average level of competition in the economy.
Innovators can be of two types, a high type (H) and a low type (L). If an
innovator of type J ∈ {H,L} invests a normalised amount z in research, she
is successful with probability aJµ (z), where µ is an increasing and concave
function satisfying standard conditions, and aH > aL. In each generation,
there is an equal share of high types and low types.
For now, we assume that an innovator's type is perfectly observable to
everyone. Then, competing lenders demand interest rate 1/[aJµ (z)]− 1 from
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type J , given which the innovator's net present value is









= aJµ (z) γπ (κi)− z, (I.4)
where e is her normalised equity contribution. With perfect information, the
innovator's net present value does not depend on her choice of nancing, since
the expected cost of both equity and external nancing is equal to the risk-free
interest rate.
Let ẑJi denote optimal, perfect-information investment by type J in indus-
try i. This is the level of investment that maximises the npvJi (z) function, and





γπ (κi) = 1. (I.5)
Condition I.5 claries that there are two (and only two) reasons why z
may vary across industries. First, industries may dier in the type of their
innovators, and, ceteris paribus, the high types always invest more than the
low types. For example, if industry i only diers from industry j for having
an innovator of the high type, then the two industries will invest ẑHi and ẑ
L
j ,
and it will be ẑHi > ẑ
L
i . Second, industries may dier in terms of the strength
of competition within them. For example, if i and j only dier in the fact that




j : investment in the more competitive industry
will be lower. The latter is the well-known Schumpeterian eect of competition
on innovation: by reducing the protability of innovation, stronger competition
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reduces the incentives to innovate. Because the Schumpeterian eect is the
only eect existing at all levels of competition, the original Schumpeterian
model predicts a monotonically decreasing relationship between competition
and innovation.
Figure 1 illustrates. We will use the functional form and parameters used
in this gure (and reported at the bottom of the gure) as a running example
in the remainder of the paper. The three panels only dier in the value of
κi, which is increasing from top to bottom as reported on the left of the
gure. By our choice of α, κi is required to range between 0.4 and 1. Panel
(a) then represents the extreme of no competition (the successful innovator is
a true monopolist), while the second and third panels progressively increase
competition. The npvJi (z) functions are represented by the thin solid curves
(all other curves should be ignored for now). Investment choices under perfect
information, ẑHi and ẑ
H
i , maximise these functions, and the related payos are
represented by solid circles. In all panels, the high types invest more than the
low types, as illustrated by ẑHi being to the right of ẑ
L
i . The Schumpeterian
eect is clearly visible from the gure: as we move from panel (a) through to
panel (c), due to increasing competitions, the npvJi (z) functions rotate inwards,
and investment by both types decreases.
II ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS
We now assume that the innovator's type is the innovator's private infor-
mation. Lenders must then determine the interest rate based solely on the
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subset of information which is observable, that is the size of the proposed in-
vestment (z) and equity contribution (e). In this section, we describe, in an
intuitive way, a specic separating equilibrium, which happens to exist when
parameters are as in our running example (the one drawn in Figure 1). In
the Appendix, we formally derive the separating equilibrium (Section A1), we
identify the parameter space such that the equilibrium exists (A2), and we
show that, in that parameter space, the equilibrium has an attractive feature:
its outcome is the only one that can reasonably realise in a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium that survives a standard renement criterion (A3).
II.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
Refer again to our running example (Figure 3.1). To describe the equilibrium,
we x competition at the level of panel (a). Later, we will conduct comparative
statics by increasing competition to the levels in panels (b) and (c).
Recall that, with perfect information, the high and low types invest ẑHi
and ẑLi respectively. It is easy to show that, with imperfect information, the
low types must continue to invest ẑLi at a separating equilibrium, contributing
any e ≤ ẑLi in equity.10 However, the high types may now be forced to invest
less than in the perfect-information case.
To see why, consider one reasonable scenario in which the high types would
be able to invest ẑHi : suppose that the lenders believed that anyone oering
to contribute their entire labour income in equity (w) are high types. Such a
belief would allow the high types to borrow ẑHi −w at their perfect-information
rate, which would mean that they are able to nance any level of investment
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at the risk-free interest rate (in expectations). Then, their net present value
would still be npvHi (z), and they would choose to invest ẑ
H
i as with perfect
information. However for this to be an equilibrium, the low types should not
want to mimic the high types. But in the example of panel (a), the low types
would indeed want to mimic the high types.
To see why, note that by contributing w in equity, and borrowing z − w
at the high types' perfect-information rate, the low types would receive net
present value











(z − w)− w, (II.1)
that is the dashed line in the gure. This line is higher than npvLi (z) in
the range where it is dened, because by mimicking the high types the low
types can pay less than the risk-free interest rate (in expectations) on external
borrowing. Then, investment gives them a higher payo than under perfect
information. Given this higher payo, it is optimal for them to mimic the high
types and propose to invest ẑHi , even though this also requires to propose to
contribute w in equity. In terms of the gure, this can be seen from the fact








. Since the low types would nd it optimal
to mimic the high types, this cannot be a separating equilibrium.
If not ẑHi , what amount can the high types invest at a separating equi-
librium? Suppose that the lenders had dierent beliefs: that even those con-


































(c): κi = 0.6
Figure 1: Illustration of the separating equilibrium. The three panels only dier by the
size of κi, which increases from top to bottom as indicated to the left of the gure. The
functional form and other parameters used are: α = 0.4; L = 100; κ = 0.7; µ (z) = 0.22
√
z;
aH = 1; aL = 0.4.
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types with equal probability.11 Given these beliefs, the high types must now
pay a higher-than-fair interest rate to invest more than zsepi , because they
would be pooled together with the low types. In terms of the gure, their net
present value is not npvHi (z) anymore, but rather the broken solid line. This
diers from npvHi (z) to the right of z
sep
i , where it equals











(z − w)− w, (II.2)
where a = (aH +aL)/2. In words, to the right of zsepi , the high types must pay
the fair interest rate of an hypothetical average agent, 1/aµ (z).
Given their new net present value function, the high types choose to invest
zsepi . They are credit constrained, in the sense that a friction of the credit
market (the non observability of talent) forces them to borrow only zsepi − w,
which is less than they would ideally do (ẑHi −w). Crucially, the low types no
longer want to mimic the high types, since the latter's conservative choice of
leverage makes mimicking no more attractive then investing ẑLi . In terms of
the gure, it is ñpvLi (z
sep






(of course, zsepi was chosen precisely to
satisfy this indierence condition). Thus, by contributing their entire income
in equity and by choosing to invest less than optimal, the high types are able
to signal themselves as talented innovators to the uninformed lenders.
What we have just described is a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
since both types pay their perfect information interest rate, innovators invest
optimally given the lenders' beliefs, and beliefs are correct in equilibrium. The
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payos corresponding to the investment choices at this separating equilibrium,
ẑLi and z
sep
i , are represented by empty circles in Figure 1.
II.2 KEY COMPARATIVE STATICS
We now come to the central result of the paper, which is to show that, at
the separating equilibrium just described, the relationship between product-












is rst increasing and then decreasing.
Consider again the example of Figure 1. We begin by increasing the
strength of competition from the level in panel (a) to the level in panel (b).
As discussed above, the curves representing npvLi (z) and npv
H
i (z) rotate in-
wards. Then, investment by the low types, which is the same as in the perfect
information case (ẑLi ), still decreases by the Schumpeterian eect. However
investment by the high types (zsepi ) now increases, as is clearly visible from
the gure.
To make sense of this, note that at this equilibrium the investment decisions
of the high types are not driven by incentives, but rather by credit constraints.
Then, the Schumpeterian eect does not apply, and what matters is the eect
of competition on credit constraints. Our key result is that stronger compe-
tition reduces credit constraints, thus allowing the high types to invest more.
This is because stronger competition discourages the mimickers: it makes in-
vestment less attractive for everyone, but particularly so for agents who are
15
considering to invest more than they would normally do. Formally, recall that
zsepi is what the high types must invest to make a genuine and a mimicking
low type equally well o. But a fall in π (κi) penalises the mimicker more than
the genuine agent, since the mimicker invests more (zsepi > ẑ
L
i ) and has thus
a higher probability of innovating. To restore equality of payos, zsepi must
then increase. In terms of gure 1, if we xed zsepi at the level of panel (a) and









. For the two to remain equal, a higher zsepi is required.
In other words, stronger competition, by creating a tougher operating en-
vironment, leads to a better selection of innovators, in the sense that the high
types can invest more and a greater share of available funds is allocated to
them. We call this the selection eect of competition on innovation.
Now suppose that κi increases further, to the level in panel (c). While
investment by the low types continues to decrease by the Schumpeterian eect,
investment by the high types continues to increase by the selection eect, to
the point that it is now equal to the perfect information level ẑHi . Now, the
high types are no longer credit constrained, because strong competition has
made ẑHi low enough relative to what they can borrow. It follows that the
Schumpeterian eect kicks back in for the high types as well, and any further
increase in competition must now decrease investment by both types.
This example suggests that, at the separating equilibrium described in the
previous section, and across industries where the innovator is of a high type,
one should nd an increasing and then decreasing relationship between the
strength of competition and innovation. This result is formally stated in
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Proposition 1. Consider any two industries i and j where the innovator is
a high type, and such that competition is stronger in j than in i, κi < κj. At
the separating equilibrium described above, there exists κ̂ ∈ (α, 1) such that,
if α ≤ κi < κj ≤ κ̂, industry j has a higher probability of innovating than
industry i, while if κ̂ ≤ κi < κj ≤ 1, industry j has a lower probability of
innovating than industry i.
Proof. Note that ñpvLi (z) is concave, and reaches a maximum at ẑ
H
i . Let













or, if such z does not exist, then zsepi = ẑ
H











i , and consider an increase in κi.
The total dierential of the equation in curly brackets in (II.3) is






















− µ (zsepi )
aHµ′(zsepi )γπ (κi)− 1
γπ′ (κi) > 0.
Since zsepi is continuously increasing in κi, while ẑ
H
i is continuously decreasing
and 0 ← ẑHi as κi → 1, there exists κ̂ ∈ (α, 1) such that, for κi < κ̂, it
is zsepi < ẑ
H




i . In the latter range, it is
dzsepi /dκi = dẑ
H
i /dκi < 0. The result follows immediately. Note that κ̂ must
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be the same across industries, since κi is the only parameter that varies across
industries.
Proposition 1 nds, for industries where the innovator is of a high type,
an increasing and then decreasing relationship between competition and inno-
vation. The region α ≤ κi < κ̂ is where the high types invest zsepi (panels a
and b in our example), while the region κ̂ ≤ κi ≤ 1 is where they invest ẑHi
(panel c). The threshold κ̂ is dened as the unique level of competition such
that zsepi = ẑ
H
i .
One shortcoming of Proposition 1 is that it only nds an increasing and
then decreasing relationship between competition and innovation across indus-
tries where the innovator is of a high type, while the relationship is decreasing
across all other industries. This does not answer our initial question about the
relationship between κi and µi, the ex-ante probability of innovation. Looking
further into this, it is immediate to see that such relationship will be decreas-
ing in the region κ̂ ≤ κi ≤ 1, where both ẑHi and ẑLi are decreasing in κi by
the Schumpeterian eect. On the other, we are now going to show that the
relationship between κi and µi will be increasing in the region α ≤ κi < κ̂,
at least for κi close enough to κ̂. So, at least in a subset of [α, 1], the model
predicts an increasing and then decreasing relationship between competition
and the ex-ante probability of innovation.
This is shown formally in:
Proposition 2. Consider any two industries i and j such that competition is
stronger in j than in i, κi < κj. At the separating equilibrium described above,
there exists κ̃ ∈ (α, κ̂) such that, if κ̃ < κi < κj ≤ κ̂, industry j has a higher
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ex-ante probability of innovating than industry i, while for κ̂i ≤ κi < κj ≤ 1,
industry j has a lower ex-ante probability of innovating than industry i.
Proof. Suppose zsepi < ẑ
H


















The total derivative dzsepi /dκi was derived in (II.3), while dẑ
L
i /dκi can be found
by taking the total dierential of (I.5) and re-arranging,












Replacing dzsepi /dκi and dẑ
L
i /dκi into the expression for dµi/dκi, imposing
dµi/dκi > 0, and re-arranging we obtain
1








[−µ′′ (ẑLi )] γπ (κi) [aH ]
2 µ′ (zsepi ) [µ (z
sep
i )− µ (ẑLi )]
.
As κi → κ̂, it is zsepi → ẑHi . As this happens, the LHS of the last inequality
approaches innity, while the RHS remains nite. Then, there exists κ̃ ∈ (α, κ̂)
such that, for κi ∈ (κ̃, κ̂), it is dµi/dκi > 0, while for κi > κ̂ it is dµi/dκi <
0. The result follows immediately. Note that κ̃ must be the same across
industries, since κi is the only parameter that varies across industries.
To make sense of the increasing part of the curve, recall that this is driven
by industries where the innovator is of a high type: in those industries, zsepi
must increase as κi increases, to restore equality of payos between a genuine
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and a mimicking low type (given that the latter suers more from a fall in
prots). But as κi approaches κ̂ and zsep approaches ẑ
H
i , which is the maximum
of the mimicker's net present value function, the gain to the mimicker from
an increase in zsepi monotonically decreases to zero. It follows that, as κi
approaches κ̂, the increase in zsepi that follows from an increase in κi must
grow unboundedly, as greater and greater increases are required to compensate
the mimicker. In contrast, in industries where the innovator is of a low type,
the decrease in ẑLi is always nite. In other words, as κi approaches κ̂, the
selection eect must always be stronger than the Schumpeterian eect. This
also suggests that the relationship between κi and µi should be convex as
we approach its peak from the left, an intuition which is conrmed by the
computational exercise in the next section.
We have derived a specic separating in which the relationship between
competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape. But when exactly will
this equilibrium esist, and how many other plausible equilibria are there? In
the Appendix, we show that our separating equilibrium exists as long as the
wage is neither too high (or else the talented innovators would not need to
borrow) nor too low (or else they would need to borrow so much, that they
would opt for being pooled with the untalented innovators). Moreover, we ar-
gue that, in this parameter sub-space, our equilibrium outcome is the only one
that can reasonably realise in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that survives
a standard renement procedure.
We conclude this section by discussing two simplifying tricks that we have
used in this paper. First, the standard Schumpeterian growth model described
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in Section I is an innite-horizon model with an overlapping generation struc-
ture, and yet the signalling game described in Section II is a static game. This
combination is only possible under a carefully selected set of assumptions. For
example, had we assumed that an innovator can invest more than once, or
that she cares about future innovators who are also more likely to succeed if
the current innovator succeeds,12 then the signalling game would have become
more complicated, as the current innovator would have had to consider the
future impact of her investment decisions. Second, we have only considered
investment at a hypothetical period t in which initial productivity is the same
across industries. But already in period t+ 1, as some industries innovate and
others do not, this assumption would necessarily be invalid. Credit constraints
would vary across industries, even keeping talent and competition constant.
While our model can easily accommodate this additional dimension of hetero-
geneity (as we show in Section III), a full analysis would need to keep track
of how credit constraints evolve over time. The role of these simplications is
obvious: they allow us to describe in a clearer way a mechanism that would
exist even in more complicated settings.
II.3 COMPUTATIONAL EXERCISE
One limitation of Proposition 2 is that it concerns itself exclusively with values
of κi close to κ̂. A computational exercise for our running example will show
that our model is able to generate the inverted-U pattern for all values of
κi ∈ (α, 1). Moreover, the cross-industry dierences in innovation rates (across
industries characterized by dierent levels of competition) are both statistically
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and economically signicant.
Panel (a) of Figure II. 3 plots the ex-ante probability of innovation for
the entire economy, µi, for all feasible values of κi (which by our choice of α
must range between 0.4 and 1).13 We see that the resulting function is indeed
increasing and then decreasing, for all feasible values of κi. As expected, the
curve is convex to the left of the peak, since the marginal eect of an increase in
κi on z
sep
i becomes innitely large as we approach the peak. Consistently with
our earlier discussion, the peak is reached for a level of competition between
0.5 and 0.6 (that is between panel b and c of Figure 1). More in detail, the
ex-ante probability of innovation increases from 0.08 for κi = 0.40 to 0.10 for
κi = 0.54, and then decreases to 0.00 as κi grows towards 1.00.
Once we have computed the predicted probabilities of innovation for both
high and low types, we can simulate industry-level patenting behavior, ag-
gregating over a large number of industries for each level of competition, in
order to generate a syntetic dataset that can be used to run Poisson regres-
sions similar to those in Aghion et al. (2005). Panel (b) of Figure II. 3 shows
the results of this exercise. In blue and on the background, we plot the his-
togram resulting from 10,000 runs of the model. We then regress the number
of patents over our measure of competition, as well as this latter coecient's
square. The resulting regression curve is plotted in red over the histogram,
and clearly displays the inverted-U shape found by the empirical literature.
An analysis of the p-values conrms the signicance of all coecients at the
0.01 level.




Figure 2: panel (a) plots the economy-wide, ex-ante probability of innovation µi. Panel
(b) reports the realised number of innovations when the model is run 10,000 times per each
level of κi (blue bars) and a quadratic Poisson regression curve of this data (red line). The
functional forms and parameters used are the same used in Figure 1.
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an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation (but rather
an increasing and convex, and then decreasing and concave relationship),14
the nding of an inverted-U by the empirical literature is consistent with the
data-generating process being driven by our mechanism.
III ADDITIONAL RESULTS
We have shown that a Schumpeterian model allowing for heterogeneous
talent of innovators and asymmetric information can predict the inverted-U,
even under the original assumption of innovators focused on post-innovation
rents. To provide corroborating evidence in support of our mechanism, we
show in this section that the equilibrium we characterise has specic features
which match the evidence well.
First, if our mechanism was important to explain the inverted-U relation-
ship between product-market competition and innovation, then we should ex-
pect that, in industries in which credit constraints are more prevalent, the
increasing part of the relationship should hold for a larger range of levels of
competition. In other words, the peak of the inverted-U should be located
more to the right. To see this formally, consider a general version of the model
in which initial productivity, Ait−1, is allowed to vary across industries.
15 As
we will show, credit constraints are more prevalent in high-productivity indus-
tries, and the peak of their inverted-U is located more to the right.
Consider rst the case of perfect information. Very little changes relative
to the baseline model. This is because prots are also linearly increasing in
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Ait−1, so that, in high-productivity industries, a higher cost of investment is
exactly oset by higher prots.16 Mathematically, the npvJi (z) functions are
still as in equation (I.4), and optimal investment levels are unchanged. In
terms of our example, the thin solid lines of Figure 1 are unchanged, and so
are their maxima. Of course, high-productivity industries will invest more in
absolute terms, ceteris paribus. In our example, suppose industries 1 and 2
both have an innovator of the high type, and face competition κi = 0.4 as in
the rst panel of Figure 1. Without loss of generality, assume A1t−1 > A2t−1.
It is ẑH1 = Ẑ
H
1 /A1t−1 = Ẑ
H
2 /A2t−1 = ẑ
H
2 under perfect information, which
immediately implies ẐH1 > Ẑ
H
2 .
Consider now the case of imperfect information. Only credit-constrained
industries are worth examining, since all other industries behave as under
perfect information. credit-constrained industries are those endowed with an
innovator of the high type, and located on the increasing part of the inverted-
U. Across these industries, normalised investment zsepi is lower lower when




i are tighter. This is because
the normalised wage wi (now with a subscript) is lower, and so is the amount
of normalised equity that the innovator is able to contribute.17 Intuitively,
the same wage buys less innovation in high-productivity industries than in
low-productivity ones. For example, consider again industries 1 and 2, which
are now credit constrained by virtue of the fact that they have a low level of











2 . This can be seen using panel (a) of Figure 1 in conjunction with
equation (II.1). A fall in wi leaves the npv
J




however it shifts the origin of curve ñpvLi (z) to the right, and the entire curve






i ) must be reached for a lower value
of zsepi .
So, credit constraints are more prevalent in high-productivity industries.
But the peak of their inverted-U must then be located more to the right.
For suppose that competition in industries 1 and 2 was at the level that puts
industry 2 at its peak (that is the minimum level such that zsep2 = ẑ
H
2 ). It would
be zsep1 < ẑ
H
1 at this point, which would imply that investment in industry 1
is still increasing in competition.
To illustrate the empirical implications of this, we repeat the computational
exercise of Section II. 3 but allowing for two dierent levels of initial industry
productivity. Industries can then be divided into two groups, high-productivity
and low-productivity. At any level of competition, credit constraints are more
prevalent in the rst group, both at the extensive and at the intensive margin.18
In Figure 3, we reproduce the inverted-U calculated in Figure II. 3, and overlay
this with the same curve calculated separately for high- and low-productivity
industries. As expected, the peak of the inverted-U is located more to the right
for high-productivity industries. Their inverted-U is initially lower, to reect
the fact that tighter credit constraints are associated with lower normalised
investment.
These results are consistent with a nding in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Grith, and Howitt (2004).19 They identify the 40% of rms subject to higher
debt-pressure, and plot their inverted-U separately.20 Consistently with our
results, they nd that their peak is located more to the right (see their gures
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Figure 3: the peak of high-productivity industries is located more to the right. The
functional form and parameters used are the same used in Figure 1. In addition, we allow
for two dierent levels of initial industry productivity, AHit−1 and A
L
it−1. These are equally






/2), and are such
that At−1/A
H




6.6a and 6.6b). They also nd that their curve is higher than for other rms,
which seems at rst inconsistent with our results. However, they use a citation-
weighted patent count as a measure of innovation, while we use the simple
patent count. To the extent that the patents of high-productivity industries
are more likely to be cited than other patents (as would seem reasonable,
given that these are more sophisticated industries that attract larger R&D
investments), a trivial extension of our model would also predict a higher
inverted-U for high-productivity industries.
A second prediction that is specic to our model is that in credit-constrained
industries, expected protability should be positively correlated with credit
constraints. Our main comparative statics has provided an example of this,
by showing that stronger competition, which is associated with lower expected
prots, leads to weaker credit constraints in credit-constrained industries. To
provide other examples, one could allow for cross-industry variation in the
overall quality of projects (the scale of aH and aL, call this a) or in the oppor-
tunity for technological upgrading (γ). Lower a or γ, which are both associated
with lower expected prots, would again make the npvJi (z) curves to rotate




i (weaker credit con-
straints).
This prediction is consistent with a nding in the nance literature accord-
ing to which rms with the largest returns on equity are also those which face
the tighter credit constraints (see Li (2011) for a review).21 Our interpretation
of this nding is that industries with high returns are particularly attractive
to lemons, exacerbating the adverse selection problem and making it harder
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for high-quality projects to be nanced. Interestingly, Li (2011) nds that the
positive relationship between returns and credit constraints is much stronger
among R&D-intensive rms than among non-R&D intensive rms. This is
consistent with our interpretation, since it is precisely in R&D-intensive in-
dustries that you would expect asymmetric information to be a major issue.
IV CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that a Schumpeterian model allowing for heterogeneous
talent of innovators and asymmetric information can predict the inverted-
U relationship between competition and innovation, even under the original
assumption of innovators focused on post-innovation rents. When competition
is low and innovation is highly protable, investment in innovation is likely to
be governed by credit constraints. Then, an increase in competition may
lead to a positive selection eect, increasing the rate of innovation even as it
reduces the post-innovation rents. When competition is high, however, the
low protability of innovation makes it less likely for credit constraints to be
important. Then, the negative impact of an increase in competition on post-
innovation rents should also result in less innovation.
The main contribution of our paper is to show that an inverted-U relation-
ship between product market competition and innovation may also emerge
amongst rms focused on post-innovation rents. Given the great importance
of these rms in the innovation process, this seems a desirable addition to our
theoretical understanding of the inverted-U. In addition, our model has two
specic predictions. First, the positive relationship between competition and
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innovation should be more pronounced in industries where credit constraints
are more prevalent. Second, the average level of credit constraints in credit-
constrained industries should be decreasing in any factor (such as stronger
product market competition) that decreases expected protability. We have
argued that these predictions are consistent with, and provide an original in-
terpretation of, existing evidence in the growth and nance literature.
One key policy implication of our work is that, at least for low levels of
competition, fostering competition is a substitute for reducing asymmetric in-
formation in nancial markets. Since the government is unlikely to develop an
informational advantage over private investors in the market for innovation, its
eorts should focus on fostering competition. The alternative explanation of
how an inverted-U between innovation and competition relationship occurs, by
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005), is based on the dynam-
ics of step by step innovation, and relies on the varying incentives of innovators
based on how far advanced they are relative to others. These dynamics are
also unlikely to be structurally aected by government policy. Hence, both ex-
planations drive toward a similar conclusion: policy should foster competition
up to a point, and in particular in industries that exhibit certain properties.
However, there is a clear advantage for policy to focus on asymmetric infor-
mation rather than dierences in technological advancement. Dierences in
technological advancement are practically hard to observe and must rely on
unsatisfactory proxies such as patenting eort. Asymmetric information, on
the other hand, leads to clear volatiliy in innovation outcomes in industries as
a whole. By measuring whether that volatility become attenuated as a result
30
of its policy eorts, the government can have a reasonable sense of whether its
policy eorts are working.
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In this Appendix, we rst formally derive the separating equilibrium dis-
cussed in the main text (Section A1). We then identify the parameter sub-
space where the separating equilibrium exists (A2), and challenge the robust-
ness of the equilibrium to a standard renement procedure (A3). We conclude
by providing more details on the computational exercise of Section II. 3 (A4).
A1. DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
This section is organised as follows. We begin, in Theorem 1, by showing
that, if ẑHi |κi=α ≤ w, the two types must invest ẑHi and ẑLi in any Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Based on this result, Theorems 2-3 focus on the
case 0 < w < ẑHi |κi=α.
Theorem 2 denes the threshold κ, it establishes its properties as a function
of w, and it then shows that, if κ ≤ κi ≤ 1, the two types must again invest
ẑHi and ẑ
L
i in any PBE. Based on this result, the theorem further restricts the
focus to the case case α ≤ κ < κ.
Theorem 3 begins by formally dening the separating equilibrium described
in Section II (points a-d). Subsequently (points 1-3), it denes the threshold
κ, and shows that the separating equilibrium exists if and only if κ ≤ κi < κ.




i in the area
where the separating equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1. If ẑHi |κi=α ≤ w, in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
the two types invest respectively ẑHi and ẑ
L
i , any combination of equity and
external nancing being possible.
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Proof. Since the opportunity cost of equity nancing is zero, the high types
are always able to invest ẑHi using only personal wealth, and the minimum




, the high types
would never select a research eort dierent from ẑHi . Furthermore, they would





fact implies that a pooling equilibrium does not exist. As shown in footnote
10, at any separating equilibrium, the low types must select ẑLi . Then, there
only exists a separating equilibrium in which the two types invest ẑHi and
ẑLi respectively. If an innovator borrows any money at such equilibrium, this











low types. Then, the innovator is indierent as to the amount borrowed, and
it is possible to construct an equilibrium with any combination of equity and
external nancing.






a threshold that continuously decreases from 1 to α as w increases from 0 to
ẑHi |κi=α. Then, if κ ≤ κi ≤ 1, in any PBE, the two types invest respectively
ẑHi and ẑ
L
i , any combination of equity and external nancing being possible.
Proof. The properties of κ as a function of w follow from the fact that ẑHi is
equal to ẑHi |κi=α for κi = α, is continuously decreasing in κ, and is equal to
0 for for κi = 1. Then, for w = 0, it must be κ = 1; κ must be continuously
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decreasing in w; and for w = ẑHi |κi=α, it must be κ = α. The rest of the
theorem can be shown in the same way as Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. If 0 < w < ẑHi |κi=α and α ≤ κi < κ, consider the following
situation:
a. Lenders believe that those who contribute w in equity and invest z ∈
(w, zsepi ] are high types, where z
sep
i is the minimum z > w such that





or, if such z does not exist, then zsepi = ẑ
H
i . They also believe that those
who contribute w in equity and invest z > zsepi are high and low types
with equal probability. Finally, they believe that everybody else are low
types.




to the rst group, rate 1/ [aµ(z)] to the
second, and rate 1/[aLµ(z)] to the third.
c. The low types invest ẑLi (any combination of equity and external nancing
being possible).
d. The high types invest zsepi (contributing w in equity).
Then, there exists w and w, with 0 < w < w < ẑHi |κi=α, such that:






2. If w ≤ w < w, situation a-d is a PBE. There exists κ̂ ∈ (α, κ) such that
it is zsepi < ẑ
H




i for κi ∈ [κ̂, κ).
3. If 0 < w < w, point 2 is still true, except that there exists κ ∈ (α, κ̂)
such that situation a-d is not a PBE if κi ∈ [α, κ).
Proof. I. (Preliminary step). Situation a-d is a PBE if and only if
npvHi (z
sep
i ) ≥ n̂pv
H
i (z) ∀z > z
sep
i . (IV.2)
To show this, we proceed in two sub-steps. I.i. If condition IV.2 does not
hold, then situation a-d is not a PBE. This follows from the fact that the high
types have a protable deviation, since they can contribute w in equity and
invest some z > zsepi , and obtain a higher payo. I.ii. If condition (IV.2)
holds, situation a-d is a PBE. This follows from the fact that the following
three facts hold true. First, for every action that borrowers could play, the
lenders' action is optimal given their beliefs. Second, for actions that borrowers
play in equilibrium, the lenders' beliefs are correct. Third, borrowers do not





represent type J 's investment prole (where eJ
denotes the innovator's equity contribution). Consider rst the high types.




i ). We want to show
that (zsepi , w) %
H (z, e) for any feasible (z, e). This follows from the fact that, if
z < zsepi , the high types can at best obtain payo npv
H
i (z). But z < z
sep
i ≤ ẑHi




i ). If z = z
sep, the only way in which (z, e) may
dier from (zsepi , w) is if e < w. But by deviating in this way, the high types are
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[z − e] <
npvHi (z
sep
i ). Finally, if z > z
sep, the high types can at best obtain payo
n̂pvHi (z), but it is n̂pv
H
i (z) ≤ npvHi (z
sep
i ) by condition (IV.2). Next, consider
the low types. Their equilibrium action, (ẑLi , e







i ). We want to show that (ẑ
L
i , e
H) %L (z, e) for any feasible
(z, e). This follows from the fact that, if e < w, or if z ≤ w, or if both
conditions hold, the low types obtain payo npvLi (z) ≤ npvLi (ẑLi ). If e = w,
and z ∈ (w, zsepi ], the low types obtain payo ñpv
L
i (z), and, by denition of
zsepi , ñpv
L




i ). If e = w, and z > z
sep
i , the low types receive payo
n̂pvLi (z). But condition (IV.2) must hold for z. Multiplying both sides of it




ẑsepi ≥ aLµ(z)γπ −
aL
a










w from both sides becomes ñpvLi (ẑ
sep
i ) ≥









II. (Preliminary step). There exist w and w, with ẑLi |κi=α < w <









otherwise; and condition (IV.2) holds if and only if w ≥ w. We
show these two points in two separate sub-steps. II.i. There exists w, with




i if w < w,
zsepi = ẑ
H
i otherwise. Suppose κi = α. Recall the denition of z
sep
i , provided
at part a) of the Theorem. Note that the function ñpvLi (z) is decreasing in w.
Given w < ẑHi |κi=α and κi = α, by Lemma 2, it is w < ẑHi . Then, the function
ñpvLi (z) (which is only dened for z > w), is concave, reaches a maximum
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i ), it is
positive and constant in both w and z. It is easy to see that, if w = ẑLi , it




i ), implying ñpv




i ). Furthermore, for
w → ẑHi , it is ñpv
L(ẑHi ) → npvLi (ẑHi ) < npvLi (ẑLi ). Then, there exists w,
with ẑLi |κi=α < w < ẑHi |κi=α, such that, if w < w, equation (IV.1) admits two
solutions zsepi and z
sep






i < ∞; if w = w, it admits
only one solution zsepi = ẑ
H
i ; and if w > w, it admits no solutions (which,
by denition, still implies zsepi = ẑ
H





for w = ẑLi , and z
sep





exists w, with ẑLi |κi=α < w < w, such that, if κi = α, condition (IV.2) holds
if and only if w ≥ w. Suppose κi = α. The function n̂pvHi (z) is concave and
maximum for ẑpooli = arg [aµ













such that zsepi ≥ ẑ
pool
i i w ≥ ŵ. In
such a case, a sucient condition for (IV.2) to hold is npvHi (z
sep














There exists w, with ẑLi |κi=α < w < ŵ such that (IV.3) holds i w ∈ [w, ŵ).





i ) is continuously increasing in w for w ∈ (0, w). To see this, start




i ). Multiplying both sides by a
H/aL and
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re-arranging, this can re-written as










where the LHS is equal to npvHi (z
sep




























which is increasing in w (note that ẑpooli does not depend on w). Second, note
that expression npvHi (z
sep




i ) is negative for w = ẑ
L
i , positive for
w = ŵ. The latter follows from earlier discussion; to see the former, recall
that, by Step II.i, it is zsepi = ẑ
L
i for w = ẑ
L
i . Then, it is
n̂pvHi (ẑ
pool




i ) = n̂pv
H
i (w) = npv
H





III. Point 2 in the Theorem. Suppose w ≤ w < w. III.i. If κi ∈ [α, κ),
situation a-d constitutes a PBE. From Lemma 2, it is κ ∈ (α, 1). If κi = α, by
Step II, condition (IV.2) holds. But the condition also holds for κi ∈ (α, κ),
which by Step I proves the result. To see this, consider two cases. First, if
zsepi ≥ ẑ
pool
i for κi = α, then such inequality also holds for κi ∈ (α, κ). This
is because, ẑpooli is decreasing in κ, while z
sep
i is either increasing or equal to
ẑHi > ẑ
pool




i implies that a sucient condition for (IV.2) to
hold is npvHi (z
sep










for κi = α, there exists κ̌ such that this inequality also holds for κi ∈ (α, κ̌),
while it is zsepi ≥ ẑ
pool
i for κi ∈ (κ̌, κ). This follows from the fact that z
pool
i
is decreasing in κi, while z
sep





κi < κ. In the rst region, that condition (IV.2) follows from the fact that it
does so for κi = α, and expression (IV.5) is increasing in κi. In the second
region, it follows from the fact that a sucient condition for (IV.2) to hold
is npvHi (z
sep




i ), which is always true. III.ii. If κi ∈ [α, κ), there





for κi ∈ [κ̂, κ). Given κi < κ, by Lemma 2, it is w < ẑHi . The function
ñpvLi (z) (which is only dened for z > w) is concave in z, reaches a maximum
at ẑHi > w, and turns negative for z large enough. At the same time, given
w < w and w ≥ w > ẑLi , by step II.i, if κi = α, equation (IV.1) admits
two solutions zsepi and z
sep






i < ∞. But
note that ẑHi is decreasing in κi and, as shown in the proof to Proposition 1,
zsepi is increasing and ñpvL (z
sep




is decreasing in κi (this can be
seen by re-arranging equation II.4). Furthermore, for κ → κ, it is w ← ẑHi ,















< 0. The result follows.
IV. Point 1 in the Theorem. Suppose w ≤ w < ẑHi |κi=α. Step III.i
still holds, with the simplication that, given w > w > ŵ, by a result in Step




i . Step III.iii
also still holds. Finally, given w ≥ w, by Step II, if κi = α, it is zsepi = ẑHi .








is decreasing in κi. It follows
that it is zsepi = ẑ
H
i for all κi ∈ [α, κ).
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V. Point 3 in the Theorem. Suppose 0 < w < w. Steps III.ii and III.iii
still hold. By Step II, if κi = α, condition (IV.2) does not hold. Furthermore,





exists κ̌ ∈ (α, κ̂) such that the last inequality also holds for κi ∈ (α, κ̌), while it
is zsepi ≥ ẑ
pool
i for κi ∈ (κ̌, κ). This follows from the fact that z
pool
i is decreasing




i for κi = κ̂. There then
exists κ ∈ (α, κ̌) such that condition (IV.2) does not hold for κi ∈ [α, κ), while
it holds for κi ≥ κ. This follows from the fact that the condition does not
hold for κi = α, that expression (IV.5) is increasing in κi, and that condition
(IV.2) holds for zsepi ≥ ẑ
pool
i . It follows that, by Step I, situation a-d is not
a PBE if κi ∈ [α, κ). Otherwise, Step III.i still applies, replacing α with κ
everywhere.
A2. EXISTENCE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
Figure 4 represents the (κi, κ, α) parameter space, by plotting κi on the vertical
axis and w = (1− α) (κα)
α
1−α on the horizontal axis. Our comparative statics
in this paper has consisted of increasing κi, for given w. However, we have
tacitly focused on a central case (w < w < w in the gure), while the remaining
cases must also be considered.
The term ẑHi |κi=α represents optimal investment by the high types when
the monopolist faces eectively no competition (it can charge price 1/α). It
is the highest amount that the high types may ever want to invest. Then,
if w ≥ ẑHi |κi=α, the high types can always nance their optimal investment













Figure 4: the striped area is where the separating equilibrium exists; the grey,
shaded area is where the model can predict an inverted-U.
0 < w < ẑHi |κi=α and κi is high enough, since a high κi pushes ẑHi down to
zero, so that it is w ≥ ẑHi . This second case is represented by the area κi ≥ κ
in the gure, where κ is the unique value of κi such that w = ẑ
H
i , and is
intuitively decreasing in w. In both cases, the separating equilibrium does not
exist, if anything because the high types would never contribute w in equity.
We show in Section A1 above that, in a PBE, innovators always invest ẑJi in
this area.
Consider next the area 0 < w < ẑHi |κi=α, κ < κ. The separating equilib-
rium must also not exist if both w and κi are very low, that is in the area
0 < w < w, α ≤ κi < κ in Figure 4, (the threshold w and κ are derived
in Section A1 above). To see why, note that ẑHi is much greater than w in
this case. It follows that ẑHi must also be much greater than z
sep
i , or else the
high types would be leveraging a lot at the separating equilibrium, and the
low types would want to mimic them. In other words, there must be a large
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discrepancy between the high types' optimal investment, and the maximum
they can invest by borrowing at their fair rate. But then the high types will
prefer to pay an adverse selection premium, borrow more, and invest more.
This point can be illustrated using the rst panel of Figure 1: if w was very
low, the maximum of the high types' net present value would not be zsepi , but
rather a local maximum to the right of it.
In summary, the separating equilibrium does not exist outside of the striped
area in Figure 4. We show in Section A1 above that, in the striped area, it
always exists. Note that this area does not perfectly overlap with the area
where the model can predict an inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovation in industries where the innovators is of a high type (the shaded
area). This is for two reasons. First, in the area w ≥ w, κi < κ, even if the
separating equilibrium exists, the threshold κ̂ does not, so that Propositions 1
and 2 do not hold. Intuitively, at such high wages, the high types can always
invest ẑHi at the separating equilibrium, so that only the decreasing part of
the relationship obtains. Second, in the area 0 < w < w, consider industries i
and j such that κ̂ ≤ κi < κj ≤ 1. Suppose further that κi < κ ≤ κj ≤ 1, or
κ ≤ κi < κj ≤ 1. While strictly speaking Propositions 1 and 2 do not apply
to industry j, or i and j, since these industries cannot be at the separating
equilibrium, their equilibrium investment must still be ẑHi and ẑ
L
i . So, it must
still be true that innovation is higher in industry i than in industry j, and the
logic of Proposition 1 and 2 carries through.
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A3. EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT
In this section, we show that our equilibrium outcome is one of only two that
can realise in a PBE that survives a standard renement procedure. We begin
in Section A3.1 by describing this in intuitive terms. The technical analysis is
contained in Section A3.2.
A3.1 OVERVIEW
We rene beliefs using a standard, dominance-based criterion (see Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green (1995), p. 469). Let action a = (z, e) be dominated for
type J , if there exists another action a′ that gives them a strictly higher payo,
for any belief that the lenders might have in equilibrium. The renement
criterion requires that if an action is dominated for one type, but not for the
other, then lenders must attach zero probability to the event that the former
type undertakes that action (see below for details). We investigate the set of
all possible PBE that survive this renement in the area of existence of our
separating equilibrium (the striped area in Figure 4).
This analysis leads to two main results. First, the renement exactly dic-
tates the beliefs that must be associated with certain actions. Most impor-
tantly, lenders must believe that only the high types would take actions of
the type (z ∈ [ẑi, zsepi ) , w) and (z ∈ [z
sep
i , ži) , w), where z
sep
i ≥ ẑHi denotes the
second point at which the mimicker's payo, ñpvLi (z), cuts through the payo
of the genuine low types,23 and ẑi ∈ [w, zsepi ) and ži > z
sep
i . This is because
these actions are dominated for the low types - any action
(
ẑLi , e ≤ ẑLi
)
gives
them a higher payo, no matter what lenders believe in equilibrium - but not
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for the high types. The beliefs in our separating equilibrium must be changed
slightly for the equilibrium to survive the renement, however the equilibrium
outcome does not change.24
Second, the above-described requirement on beliefs implies that the PBE
must be a separating equilibrium in which the high types contribute w in
equity, and invest either zsepi or z
sep
i . Intuitively, these beliefs make it subop-
timal for the high types to take any other action in a separating equilibrium.
They also rule out the existence of a pooling equilibrium, for the same reason
why our separating equilibrium exists: given the possibility to invest zsepi and
be identied as high types, the high types prefer this to another action that
would pool them together with the low types, even if that other action would
allow them to invest more. Of course, this logic only works inside the area
of existence of the separating equilibrium, where w (and thus zsepi ) is high
enough.
To invest zsepi gives the high types exactly the same payo as to invest
zsepi . Furthermore, the two thresholds behave in an exactly symmetric fashion.
Then, zsepi is decreasing in κi. It follows that the main result of the paper needs
to be qualied, since across industries where the innovator is of a high type,
and invests zsepi , the model still predicts a monotonic, decreasing relationship
between competition and innovation. Of course, such a relationship is not
due to the Schumpeterian eect, but to the eect of competition on credit
constraints.
We think that, on balance, these results are good news for our theory.
Most crucially, our key equilibrium outcome, zsepi , is one of only two which
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may realise in a rened PBE. And, while the existence of zsepi as an alternative
equilibrium outcome makes it in principle harder for the model to predict
an inverted-U, one may reasonably question whether such outcome will ever
be observed. After all, while zsepi and z
sep
i give exactly the same payos to
both lenders and borrowers, zsepi always implies a lower debt, and thus a lower
expected size of default. If there was any additional cost from default, which
increased with the size of the default, then zsepi would always be the preferred
choice.
A3.2 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
We closely follow the discussion in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995),
p. 469. We use to the second (and second-weakest) form of domination-based
renement discussed in the textbook (Eq. 13.AA.2). Let J ∈ J = {H, J}
denote the type of the innovator. Let a ∈ A = {(z, e) : z ≥ 0, 0 ≤ e ≤ z}
denote the choice of investment and equity contribution made by the innovator.
Let π (J |a) denote the probability that lenders assign to the innovator being of
type J , conditional on observing action a ∈ A, and let r ∈ R = {r : r ≥ 1} be
the interest rate that they require. Let u (a, r, J) denote the expected payo
to an innovator of type J .
We will say that action a is strictly dominated for type J if there exists
another action a′ with
min
r∈[1/[aHµ(z′)],1/[aLµ(z′)]]
u (a′, r, J) > max
r∈[1/[aHµ(z)],1/[aLµ(z)]]
u (a, r, J) . (IV.6)
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Dene the set J
∗
(a) ⊆ J as
J
∗
(a) = {J : there is no a′ ∈ A satisfying (IV.6)} .
Our denition of a PBE with reasonable beliefs is as follows:
Denition 1. A PBE has reasonable beliefs if for all a ∈ A with J∗ (a) 6= ∅,
µ (J |a) > 0 only if J ∈ J∗ (a).
In other words, if an action is dominated for type J , and for type J only,
then beliefs are said to be reasonable if and only if lenders attach a zero
probability to the event that someone taking action a is of type J .
We are now ready to present our renement result:





minimum and maximum z > w such that









i . Then, any
PBE that has reasonable beliefs in the sense of Denition 1 is a separating
equilibrium where the low types invest ẑLi (any contribution of equity and ex-
ternal nancing being possible), and the high types invest either zsepi or z
sep
i
(contributing w in equity).
Proof. There exist ẑi ∈ [w, zsepi ) and ži > z
sep
i such that, at any PBE that has
reasonable beliefs in the sense of Denition 1, for any a = (z, w) such that
z ∈ (ẑi, zsepi ) ∪ (z
sep
i , ži), lenders must believe µ (L|a) = 0. To see this, note
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, with e ≤ ẑLi , such that
min
r∈[1/[aHµ(ẑLi )],1/[aLµ(ẑLi )]]





ñpvLi (zi) = max
r∈[1/[aHµ(zi)],1/[aLµ(zi)]]
u (a, r, L) ,
(IV.9)
where the inequality follows from the denition of zsepi and z
sep
i .
A PBE that has reasonable beliefs in the sense of Denition 1 cannot be a
pooling equilibrium. To see this, proceed by contradiction. Suppose the PBE






be the action taken by both
types in equilibrium. Distinguish two cases. If zpooli > z
sep
i , then the payo to






























where ε is a small enough number. The last inequality follows from Theorem
3 and from continuity: since situation a-d is a PBE in this parameter sub-
space, it must be npvHi (z
sep
i ) ≥ n̂pv
H




i − ε) ≥ n̂pv
H
i (z),
∀z > zsepi (where the strict inequality follows from the fact that we have as-
sumed κ > κ instead of κ ≥ κ). So, the high types could increase their payo



















− epooli < npvHi (z
sep
i − ε),
where the inequality follows from continuity, given ε is low enough. Again,
the high types could increase their payo by choosing (zsepi − ε, w). Finally, if
0 ≤ zpooli < z
sep
























where the second inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ zpooli < z
sep
i −ε ≤ ẑHi
for ε low enough. Once again, the high types could increase their payo by
choosing (zsepi − ε, w).
Let a = (z, e) be such that either z ∈ {zsepi , z
sep
i } and e < w, or z ∈
(zsepi , z
sep
i ) and ei ≤ w. Then, at any separating equilibrium, it must be
π (H|a) < 1. To see this, proceed by contradiction. Suppose it was π (H|a) =
1. Then, the low types could take action a, obtaining payo ñpvLi (z) +
aH−aL
aH
















, they would have a protable deviation, contradicting the
notion that this is a PBE.
The Theorem now follows. To see this, note that it was shown in footnote





, with e ≤ ẑLi . As for the high types, they could not take an action
(z, e) such that either z ∈ {zsepi , z
sep




i ) and e ≤ w,
since if they did, by step III, the lenders' beliefs would be incorrect. At the
same time, they could not take an action such that z < zsepi , since their payo
would at best be npvHi (z), and it would always be possible to nd ε > 0
small enough so that z < zsepi − ε. Since npvHi (z) < npvHi (z
sep
i − ε), the high
types could then increase their payo by choosing (zsepi − ε, w). Finally, by
a symmetric logic, the high types could not be choosing an action such that
z > zsepi . It follows that the high types must either take action (z
sep
i , w) in a
PBE, or action (zsepi , w).
A4. DETAILS ON THE COMPUTATIONAL EXERCISE
To generate panel (b) of Figure II. 3, using MATLAB, we rst create a large
matrix by taking 121 evenly spaced values of κi, going from α = 0.4 to 1,
and then stacking this vector 10, 000 times.25 Each of the elements of the
resulting matrix can be interpreted as one industry. Having κi as well as α,
we can easily compute the average level of competition, κ, and prots, as
dened by equation (I.2).26 We assign one innovator's type to each industry
using standard pseudo-random draws, where the probability of each of the two
possible outcomes is xed at 0.5.
We then want to compute the probability of successful innovation for each
industry, which is characterized by a competition level-innovator's type pair.
In doing so, we assume the specic equilibrium conguration described in the
paper. This makes working with low-types straightforward, as they always
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choose ẑLi , which we can compute using condition (I.5). We have computed
prots already, so we need to pick values for aL and for γ, as well as a functional
form for µ. We choose aL = 0.4 and γ = 1.1; as for µ, our choice of functional
form is guided by the following considerations:
• As stated in the paper, µ is increasing and concave;
• we want it to be tractable and invertible, since we'll need to work with
its inverse in order to compute ẑLi ; and
• throughout this computational exercise, we need to stay in the region of
the parameter space where our model generates an inverted-U pattern.27
We thus choose µ(z) = 0.22
√
z.28 Once we have ẑLi for each low type
industry, it's easy to compute the desired probabilities as aLµ(ẑLi ).
Dealing with high-type innovators is trickier, as they will choose ẑHi or z
sep
i ,
following the logic described in Section I. For each high-type industry, then,
we eectively need to model the behavior of both high and low type innovators.




i ), then we compute ẑ
H
i using the
same methodology (that is, condition (I.5), this time with aH = 1). We then
check for which high-type industries ñpvLi (z) (computed using equation (II.1))
goes above npvLi (ẑ
L
i ). For these industries, we pick z
sep
i as the equilibrium




i ) for all z ≥ 0, we pick ẑHi .
Finally, we use the formula aHµ(.) to compute the equilibrium probability of
successful innovation.
Once we've computed the probability of successful innovation for each in-
dustry, we use it as a parameter of a binomial distribution, in order to simulate
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real world patenting behavior and generate a synthetic dataset. The resulting
histogram, obtained by collecting into bins corresponding to the 121 values of
κi all the patents secured by both high and low types, is plotted in blue in
panel (b) of Figure II. 3.
We also use this synthetic dataset to generate the red curve overlayed onto
the histogram. To do so, we follow the methodology used in Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005) as closely as our synthetic dataset allows
us to. Specically, we compute a Poisson regression of the total number of
patents on a constant (β0), our vector of κi, and a vector containing κ
2
i for each
i.29 Let the vector containing all κi be indicated as K, the vector containing κ
2
i
as K2, and the corresponding regression coecients as β1 and β2, respectively.
The red curve is then computed as:




1The pattern has been observed in the US (Scherer (1967); but see Hashmi (2013) for
contradicting results), the UK (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005)),
Japan (Michiyuki and Shunsuke (2013)), the Netherlands (Polder and Veldhuizen (2012)),
Sweden (but only for specic measures of competition: see Tingvall and Karpaty (2011)),
France (but only for large rms: see Askenazy, Cahn, and Irac (2013)), and Switzerland
(Peneder and Woerter (2014)), and for the pharmaceutical industry in a panel of 26 countries
studied by Qian (2007).
2Akcigit and Kerr (2018) estimate a Shumpeterian model with multi-product incumbents
and new entrants, using US data. They nd that incumbents innovating on new product lines
together with new entrants account for more than 80% of aggregate productivity growth.
They argue that this nding is consistent with the empirical literature surveyed in Foster
and Krizan (2001). The fact that established rms who do not reap pre-innovation rents
face much the same incentives to innovate as new entrants is recognised by the literature,
see for example Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001), p. 469).
3See for example Schoonhoven and Lyman (1990) and Katila and Shane (2005).
4 The general idea of "skin in the game as a screening device" has emerged repeatedly
in the academic Finance literature. Applications to the eld of entrepreneurship - and its
nancing - go all the way back to Leland and Pyle (1977); more recent contributions include
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004), Skeie (2007), and Conti and Rothaermel (2013), among
others. DeMarzo and Due (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) provide examples of this principle
in the context of security design.
5For subsequent modications of their model, see Askenazy, Cahn, and Irac (2013) and
Hashmi (2013).
6Some of these papers focus on rms innovating on products they currently produce, thus
sharing the same empirical limitations as Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt
(2005)) (see Chernyshev (2016) and Rauch (2008)). Other papers rely on ad-hoc modica-
tions of the standard model: Mukoyama (2003) needs imitators to play an important role
alongside innovators; Scott (2009) requires rms to have a dierent perception of compe-
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tition at dierent levels of competition; and Onori (2015) requires external learning from
innovation to be more important than internal learning.
7In a related contribution, Chiu, Meh, and Wright (2017) develop a model in which
entrepreneurs get new ideas randomly and without paying any R&D costs, but search
frictions and the presence of nancial intermediaries inuence the process of technological
tranfer. That is, their focus is on the allocation of these new blueprints to the agents who
have the most talent for developing them and bringing them to market.
8This assumption, also made by Aghion and Howitt (2009), simplies the model by ruling
out that credit constraints are weaker in industries where initial productivity, and thus the
size of investment, is lower. Please refer to Section III for the discussion of a more general
version of the model in which this assumption is dropped.
9This demand function can be found by taking the rst derivative of I.1 with respect to
Xit.
10To see this, suppose the low types invested z 6= ẑLi . Since this is a separating equilibrium,
the low types would have to be asked an expected interest rate equal to the risk-free rate,
and their payo would have to be npvLi (z). But, by choosing ẑ
L
i , they could have not been
asked a higher expected rate (in equilibrium), and they would have thus obtained at least
npvLi (ẑ
L
i ) > npv
L
i (z
L). It follows that z is not the low types' optimal choice: a contradiction.
11More precisely, lenders believe that those contributing w in equity are high types if they
invest an amount lower than or equal to zsepi , and high or low types with equal probability
if they invest more than zsepi . Additionally, they believe that those contributing less than
w in equity are low types.
12For example, the future innovator could be someone who inherits the current innovator's
talent, and whose payos are important to the current innovator (e.g. a descendant or
employee whom the current innovator coaches). Then, her current innovator would worry
about the reputation she establishes in period 1.
13We refer to Appendix A4 for a complete description of the methodology used.
14It is our understanding that the convexity to the immediate left of the peak, and the
concavity to its right, are a general feature of the model, but we haven't shown that in a
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formal proposition.
15We assume Ait−1 to be uncorrelated with talent, and with the level of competition.
16Recall that prots are found by substituting the (constant) optimal price in the demand
faced by the monopolist, Pit = α (Ait−1L/Xit−1)
1−α
, by solving for the equilibrium quantity
Xit−1, and by multiplying this by the (constant) prot per unit. Since Xit−1 is linear in
Ait−1, so are prots. Normalised prots are then as in equation (I.2), and do not depend
on Ait−1.
17Since the wage is determined in the economy-wide labour market, it is a linear function
of average (as opposed to industry-specic) productivity. The normalised wage is then
wi = wAt−1/Ait−1.
18We have shown that if industries 1 and 2 are both credit constrained, then credit
constraints are tighter in 1 (intensive margin). It is also possible that 1 is credit constrained
while 2 is not, but not the opposite (extensive margin).
19We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
20They identify these rms as those with the highest debt-payments-to-cash-ow (D/C)








for non credit-constrained industries, and (zsepi −W/Ait−1)/npvHi (z
sep
i ) for credit-constrained
ones. While the former is increasing in Ait−1 (since ẑ
H
i is unchanged), the latter can be
increasing or decreasing (since zsepi decreases). So, our high-productivity industries are not
necessarily those with the higher D/C ratio. This is counterintuitive, as you would expect in-
dustries that require greater investment to feature both a higher D/C ratio and tighter credit
constraints. This undesirable feature of the model is the result of simplifying assumptions.
With a unied labour market, a higher Ait−1 only makes it more expensive to innovate,
without increasing the innovator's capacity to contribute (in other words, it only reduces
wi). This results in much tighter credit constraints, and may result in a lower D/C ratio.
However if the wage was partially related to industry productivity, then credit constraints
would still be tighter in high-productivity industries (and the peak of their inverted-U would
still be located more to the right), and so would be the D/C ratio. To see this, consider
an extreme case in which the wage increases almost linearly with Ait−1, so that wi is only
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marginally lower in high-productivity industries. Then, credit constraints ẑHi − z
sep
i would
still be (marginally) tighter (since ẑHi is unchanged and z
sep
i still decreases), and the D/C
ratio would be higher (since zsepi decreases only marginally).











i ) /w for
the high types. It is easy to show that these are decreasing in κi. For the low types,


















/dκi ≥ 0: multiplying by aL/aH






















i /dκi, and dROE
L
i /dκi < 0.
22This case must be considered, as there always exist admissible values of the other pa-
rameters of the model, γ and aJ , and admissible forms of the function µ (.), such that
ẑHi |κi=α ≤ w.
23The existence of such point can be gauged from the top panel of Figure 1. The function
ñpv
L
i (z) is a parabola reaching its maximum at ẑ
H
i . It must then cut through the horizontal




twice, to the left and to the right of ẑHi .
24Beliefs must be changed in the following way. First, lenders must believe that those
taking actions of the type (z ∈ [zsepi , ži) , w) must be high types. Second, they must believe
the same for those taking actions of the type (z ∈ (ẑi, zsepi ) , w − ε) or (z ∈ (z
sep
i , ži) , w − η),
where ε and η are small enough numbers. No other belief must be changed. Since to invest
zsepi gives the high types exactly the same payo as to invest z
sep
i , it is easy to see that the
outcome of the equilibrium does not change.
25The value of α is chosen in order to be broadly consistent with the labor share of income
as recorded in the U.S. in postwar years.
26To compute prots we also need to assign a value to L and we choose L = 100.
27This is discussed in Appendix A2. What's particularly relevant for us at this stage is
that the wage, w, needs to be between w and w. The wage can be computed using equation
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ẑHi − npvLi (ẑHi )],












(aLµ(ẑLi )γπ(κi)− ẑLi ],




z goes to innity as z grows, so there might be a concern of the
resulting probabilities of successful innovation being larger than one. This doesn't happen
in our simulations, where the probabilities are in fact rather small, and always smaller than
0.18.
29As in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005), these vectors are demeaned.
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